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ABSTRACT
There has been a recent explosion in the volume of communication between 
constituents and their representatives in Congress. There is an intradisciplinary 
disagreement about what—if any—role this communication plays in the federal legislative 
decision making process. David Mayhew makes a persuasive argument based on 
reelection realities that this input from constituents affects the legislative decisions made 
by members of Congress. However, others, such as Robert Bernstein, maintain there is 
no causal relationship between constituent input and the decisions made by members of 
Congress.
In order to ascertain the degree to which this causal relationship exists—if it exists 
at all—comparative content analysis techniques were used. Almost 3,500 pieces of mail 
were received in one Congressional office during a four week period. This mail was 
analyzed and compared to the sixty-nine roll call votes which took place during the same 
month. The research question being asked was: what role did that constituency input- 
measured by mail received in the office—play in the legislative decision making process 
of that member—measured by her/his roll call voting behavior?
The evidence revealed that this particular kind of constituent input played almost 
no role in roll call voting. The additional logical research steps of comparing supportive 
and opposing mail was not possible because of the lack of congruence between the mail 
issues and the vote issues. However, in the few instances where there were votes
viii
on issues mentioned in some of the mail, the member’s votes were somewhat consistent 
with the wishes of the constituents who contacted the office. These instances were scant, 
however. By-and-large, the issues that caused people to write were quite different than 
those voted on by members of Congress. There was no direction from constituents for 
most of the roll call votes. In this case study, it was difficult for constituent mail to have 
much of a role in Congressional decision making because the issues that constituents 
wrote about were not even on the Congressional agenda.
However, before a sweeping conclusion is reached that constituencies have no role 
to play in legislative decision making, it is important to remember that this research was 
a case study and—out of necessity—omits key elements of potential constituent control 
such as elite mail input and casework. In addition, the inclusion of all mail received- 
including generated mail—diminished the role played by individual "non-generated" letters.
IX
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It is an understatement to say there is an intradisciplinary disagreement about
what—if any—role the constituencies of elected representatives play in the federal
legislative decision making process. Almost 3,500 pieces of mail were received in one
Congressional office during a one month period. This mail was analyzed and compared
to the sixty-nine roll call votes which took place during the same month. The research
question being asked was: what role did that constituency input—measured by mail
received in the office—play in the legislative decision making process of that member-
measured by her/his roll call voting behavior?
There is no widely accepted rule about what result to expect in a study of this
relationship. Views vary greatly. Parker states, "There is little question that constituency
attitudes and opinions are influential in determining roll call voting of Congressmen..."1
However, in contrast, Marger observes,
Many studies have indicated that there is little relationship between 
electoral preferences and the responsiveness of legislators to those 
preferences.2
Bernstein (1989), also says,
The myth of constituency control is not a harmless folk tale to be passed onto
'Glenn Parker, Characteristics o f Congress (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 171.
2Martin Marger, Elites and Masses (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987), 244.
1
2
future generations of students. It fundamentally misstates the relationship between 
the constituency and the representatives.3
These are not new disagreements. The relationship between the ruled and the 
rulers has been contemplated for centuries. The classic Greek philosophers were generally 
against the average person having any say in the day-to-day operation of the government. 
That was left up to those rulers who knew, it was thought, the appropriate courses of 
action to take in pursuit of the common good.
The United States' political heritage is rich in the belief that the only way the 
power of the government can be legitimate is by the consent of the governed. Even as 
early as 1620, the Mayflower Compact set guidelines for local self-rule. John Locke, who 
had tremendous influence in the foundation of the United States' government, argued, in 
his 1690 Second Treatise o f Government, that people voluntarily consent to a political 
authority in return for secure enjoyment of their liberties.4
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, published in 1762, popularized the idea 
of democratic self-government.5 He argued against the repressive forms of government 
of the time and concluded that government should clearly be subordinate to the will of 
the people. Wiser said,
Democracy for Rousseau meant direct or participatory democracy and as
3Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior. 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 105.
4Ronald Pynn, American Politics (Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole, 1984), 44.
5James L. Wiser, Political Philosophy: A History o f the Search for Order (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 265.
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such required the active exercise of political virtue by citizens who were 
simultaneously both the subjects and objects of the political association.6
Clearly, the "will of the people" would be heard and play a large role in decision making
if all the people themselves—not elected representatives—were actually voting on each
issue, such as in New England town meeting situations. However such a pure, direct
democracy is rarely possible, and distinctly impossible in a nation as large and complex
as the late-twentieth-century United States.
John Stuart Mill accepted the necessity of representative democracy. He saw it
as the best possible form of government. He blended his Benthamite commitment to
popular self-rule with the Saint-Simonist argument that experts should be in ruling
positions. He concludes that the experts, or elites, should run the government but the
people retain the sovereign power of controlling them.7
When the founding fathers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to begin constructing a new
system of government for the newly formed free country, they had to contend with the
question of representation for the people under this new political authority. The idea of
self-rule had gained in popularity at the time of the Constitutional Convention but there
were restraints on the enthusiasm. Rossiter observes,
The men of 1787, who distrusted the plebiscitary democracy, deserve much credit 
for the success of the constitutional democracy that was to establish itself in 




and steadiness of the people,they nevertheless rested the new government upon the 
broad base of popular sovereignty.8
Clearly, the founding fathers were leery of "the masses" having too much power. An
example of this concern is the original stipulation that senators be elected by the state
legislatures rather than by popular election—as they are now via the Seventeenth
Amendment adopted in 1913. In addition, the framers envisioned a much different and
active role for the Electoral College in the selection of the president. While developing
this new government, they sought to find an appropriate balance between true
representation of the people’s interest and restraint of the masses.
In response to this difficult task, they spent a noteworthy amount of time detailing
the legislative branch article of the Constitution. It is the longest and the most precise of
the seven articles. Janda, et al. point out,
In structuring their new government, the framers began with the legislative branch 
because they thought law-making was the most important function of a republican 
government.9
It is clear that law making is an important function of the federal government. It 
is not clear, however, from a U.S. Constitutional standpoint, and it is even less apparent 
from a philosophical standpoint, what role the constituencies should play in this law 
making process. Tocqueville, said,
So direction really comes from the people, and though the form of government is 
representative, it is clear that the opinions, prejudices, interests, and even passions
8Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1987), 272.
9 Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey Berry, and Jerry Goldman The Challenge o f Democracy: 
Government in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 89.
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of the people can find no lasting obstacles from being manifest in the daily 
conduct of society.10 12*4
Our political heritage and the Constitution indicate that some influence is expected, 
but how much is debatable.
Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol identified two styles of 
representation: delegates and trustees." Delegates feel they must consult the people 
they represent on pending matters and accept their instructions. The trustees feel they 
must make decisions independently because their constituents have entrusted them to do 
so. Political scientists went on to identify a third style: the politico. The politico vacillates 
between the other two and determines when is the best time to act in each role, depending 
on the situation.'2 The very existence of these classic delegate, trustee, and politico 
descriptions of legislative roles demonstrates that there are different perceptions about how 
much influence the constituents have.
Despite this lack of agreement on the role constituents play in the process, the 
decision making and the constituent input continues. In 1993, the House of 
Representatives received 30,612,000 pieces of mail" and had 597 recorded votes'4. 
Keefe says,
10Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 173.
11 Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) Guide to Congress (Washington DC:CQ Inc., 1991), 505.
l2Ibid.
"David Dunn, Assistant Director, U.S. House of Representatives Post Office, interviewed 
February 25, 1994, Washington D.C.
14Congressional Record, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), vol.139, 
no. 168, D1389.
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Congress is the first branch of government. Its permanent importance is that it’s 
positioned, both by the Constitution and by the expectations of many people, at 
the center of national policymaking.15
Consequently, Congress is the primary avenue the governed feel they can utilize to let
their preferences for government policies be known.
By all measures, there has been an explosion in the volume of communication
between members of Congress and their constituents in the past twenty years. Incoming
mail to the House of Representatives has increased five-fold from 1972 to 1989.16 There
is little question that members of Congress consistently have the voters in their
constituencies on their minds. For example, Frantzich cites the following advice given
to a new member of Congress by a senior colleague,
Give close and prompt attention to your mail. Your votes and speeches may make 
you well known and give you a reputation, but it is the way you handle your mail 
that determines your reelection.17
How this mindset described above translates into policy is what this study explored.
The question about the role of constituencies in legislative decision making is not 
new to political science. Particularly since the early 1970s, there has been a myriad of 
studies analyzing it. The next chapter reviews the literature in this research area.
15William J. Keefe, Congress and the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1988), 1.
16Robert Vota, House Postmaster, Congressional Quarterly’s (CO) Guide to Congress 
(Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1991), 508.
17Stephen Frantzich, Write Your Congressman (New York:Praeger, 1986), 21.
CHAPTER H 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The true answer to the research question—what is the constituency’s role in 
congressional decision making—is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Social science 
research limitations make it truly onerous to operationalize the concept of constituency 
opinion. There is no completely accurate way to operationalize it. Public opinion is a 
nebulous concept with many nuances and caveats. This problem is a constant theme in 
this area of research.
The difficulty of defining constituency opinion is compounded in this, and other 
studies, by the additional problem of identifying the difference between straight public 
opinion and constituent pressure from the district felt by members of Congress. They are 
different. People who contact their representatives tend to be more politically active. 
They have a higher SES.1 Consequently, all research designs in this area fall short of 
pinpointing these concepts exactly. Clearly, even this study identifying the mail that 
comes into a congressional office as constituency opinion fails to encompass all of the 
nuances of public opinion and constituent pressure.
The dominant feature in this body of research is the practice of measuring passive 
constituency sentiment and not measuring active constituent input (mail). For the most




part, researchers measured how constituents felt about issues by asking them (opinion 
polls), or made assumptions about how the constituents felt based on their collective 
personal backgrounds or their state's financial situation.
Interestingly enough, every study reviewed and apparently almost every study in 
the field falls short of measuring actual individual constituent pressure. A word search 
of the electronic files at the Library of Congress of article titles published from 1976-1994 
in the following journals: American Journal o f Political Science, American Political 
Science Review, American Politics Quarterly, Journal o f Politics, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Policy Studies Review, Political Behavior, Polity, Public Opinion Quarterly, 
and Western Political Quarterly produced no pertinent journal articles with the word 
"mail" in the title. While further inspection of the journal titles produced an abundance 
of related material, no journal research in the specific area of constituent generated mail 
was found. It appears there is a research void of studies measuring active constituent 
input. There is no widely publicized study of the letters and phone calls about legislative 
matters that constituents send to their representatives in Congress. Consequently, this 
literature review was broadened to include studies that utilized different measures to 
operationalize constituency opinion. Thirteen authors were reviewed. The difficult 
challenge of operationalizing the concept of "constituency" opinion was met with varying 
degrees of success by these authors. Depending on the focus of their study, they utilized 
a variety of mechanisms to measure constituency opinion.
The results of these studies vary as greatly as the subjective opinions about the 
topic. Most of the variations in the conclusions are—as is often the case—a result of how
9
their research design was set up and which aspect of the representation relationship they 
focused.
It would be impractical to attempt to include all studies analyzing the effect of 
non-mail measures of constituent opinion on the roll call voting behavior of individual 
members of Congress. Instead, a cross section of the more straight forward studies will 
be reviewed.
James Kau and Paul Rubin’s 1982 study of House votes to increase the minimum 
wage employed maximum-likelihood estimates based on probit analysis to determine the 
relative influence of each of the independent variables.2 Kau and Rubin utilized 
questionable indirect measures of constituent opinion. Those variables were: constituency 
opinion measured by 1) average hourly earnings in manufacturing, 2) the percentage of 
workers unionized, 3) the percentage of black population in each district. They also 
controlled for ideology measured by American for Democratic Action (ADA) scores, and 
party.
The estimates measured the degree of influence an increase in an independent 
variable has on the probability a member will support a vote to increase the minimum 
wage. A negative estimate indicates an increase in the independent variable will increase 
the probability the member will oppose raising the minimum wage. Their findings are 
listed in table 1.
2James Kau and Paul Rubin, Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants 
o f Roll Call Voting in the House o f Representatives. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 17.
10
There was statistically significant constituency influence measured by average
hourly earnings in 1955, 1961, 1966, and 1974; and by percentage of black population
in 1966. Ideology was statistically significant in each time period of the study.
TABLE 1 RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION 
MEASURED BY: AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS, 
UNIONIZATION OF WORKERS PERCENTAGE, AND BLACK 
POPULATION PERCENTAGE; IDEOLOGY; AND PARTY; ON 






































-0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.09 -0.08
* SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL 
SOURCE: Kau and Rubin (1982), 59.
This first study reviewed and the next seven are similar in design and are 
characteristic of the vast volume of work published from the early 1970s to 1994. They 
measure constituent input and determine if there is a causal relationship with votes on
similar issues.
11
However, some of the constituency opinion measurements, such as those listed 
above in the Kau and Rubin study, require immense leaps in logic. These studies were 
included because there is an abundance of research using these questionable measures. 
However, the drawbacks of these research design components are considerable and must 
be noted.
The credibility of studies that attempt to compare the relative impact of 
constituency opinion to congressional voting disintegrates when the singular measures of 
constituency opinion are such far-removed concepts as average hourly earnings of 
workers, percentage of the workers unionized, and the percent of the population that is 
black as listed above. This is particularly troublesome because of all the literature like 
this reviewed in this chapter, the studies utilizing the more questionable and far-removed 
measures of constituency opinion were the studies that found statistically significant 
associations between constituency opinion and roll voting behavior.
In addition, there are credibility problems with the many studies that identify a 
member’s personal ideology by ratings from the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), or similar groups such as in the Kau 
and Rubin study above. This is particularly disturbing because in most of the studies 
reviewed, ideology was found to be statistically significantly associated with decision 
making.
ADA, ACA, and other group’s ratings are not always a close reading of the 
personal ideology of members of Congress. They can be more accurately described as
voting histories of the members.3 This fact becomes clear when the rating process used 
by the ADA and other groups is explored. The ADA selects twenty votes each in the 
House and Senate that were important to their organization during the prior session of 
Congress. They then assign five points to each vote and rate members of Congress based 
upon whether or not they supported the .ADA’s agenda. A score of one-hundred is the 
best; zero is the worst. On the surface this seems to be an accurate reflection. Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) and Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN), both quintessential 
liberals, scored very high—one hundred—on the ADA scale in 19934.
However, a moderate ADA rating would not be an accurate reflection, for 
example, of a senator or congressman from a conservative state or district who in fact is 
personally pro-gay rights—a liberal stance—but has always voted against gay rights for 
politically expedient reasons. This member's ADA rating—based in part on his anti-gav 
rights voting pattern—makes it appear he is personally more conservative on this issue. 
However in this example, the member would not be personally conservative on this issue. 
A possible explanation is that as a potential member of Congress he did not feel it was 
worth alienating a large segment of voters—as poll results may have indicated he would 
if he said he was pro-gay rights—and gave in to what the majority of the voters—his 
eventual constituents—wanted him to do.
3Valerie Dulk, Program Director of Americans for Democratic Action, interviewed January 
28, 1994, Washington DC.
4Amy Issacs, National Director of Americas for Democratic Action, interviewed January 28, 
1994, Washington DC.
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This possible, and arguably likely, explanation of some member’s-policy positions 
is of little importance to the ADA and other groups. A vote against their agenda is 
against their agenda, regardless of the motivation. However, it is of great importance to 
researchers who are trying to ascertain the extent to which representative democracy 
operates.
Unfortunately, the use of ADA and other groups’ ratings for ideology is 
widespread for the lack of more accurate alternatives. It would be impossible to get 
reliable answers from politicians to the necessary questions such as: "which issues did you 
feel were expendable enough to vote against your conscience in order to secure a political 
victory?" Consequently, the use of these ratings has set up research situations where it 
appears the "ideology" category plays a very large role in determining congressional 
voting decisions, but not only for the reasons the researchers conclude.
While voting history and actual personal ideology are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive items, if they are not the same for some members on some issues it has serious 
ramifications in the study of the role constituencies play in legislative decision making 
because the influence of the constituents is camouflaged by an initial commitment to get 
elected followed by an intact consistent voting history. It is logical that a member’s 
voting history is likely to repeat itself. Members do not like to be perceived as 
"waffling".5 Consequently, it is highly unlikely they will vote out of character.
5Mail Manager for a member of Congress, interviewed November 1, 1993, Washington DC.
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Therefore it will appear as if ideology is taking precedent over constituency 
preferences, when in fact it may be the opposite. The member may have given into 
constituency pressure on some issues in order to get elected long before coming to 
Congress and sticks to those positions because he does not want to risk the political fall­
out of switching.
Fenno, in examination of this phenomenon, observes that politicians, when 
developing their relationship with the public, go through two stages: an expansionist stage 
and a protectionist stage.6 The early stage consists of assembling a group of supporters 
that guarantees electoral victory. It is plausible that during this early stage a great deal of 
constituent input takes place. However it is impossible to ascertain the extent of this 
phenomenon in this study.
In his 1979 study of 1976 natural gas deregulation votes in the House, Edward 
Mitchell argued that constituency support for passing deregulation bills could be 
determined by: gas production in the district, current level of gas curtailment by the 
regulations, percentage of homes heating with gas in the district, and average residential 
gas consumption in the district.7 Again, these are questionable and indirect measures of 
constituency opinion. Party, ideology based on ADA ratings, level of urbanization, 
percentage of white collar jobs, and the member’s percentage of the vote in the 1974 
election were controlled.
6Richard Fenno, Homestyle: House Members and their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1978), 172.
7Edward Mitchell, "The Basis of Congressional Energy Policy," Texas Law Review 57 (1979):
593.
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The author used multiple regression analysis to determine how much influence 
each of these independent variables had on voting. He used the logit analysis procedure 
relating variation in each of the independent variables to variation in the dependent 
variable while holding constant the variation in each of the other independent variables. 
Table 2 illustrates that the t-values from the regression analysis of constituency opinion 
measured by gas production, ideology, and party, were statistically significant.
Chris Dennis, as reported in Bernstein (1989), studied tax egalitarianism in 1978 
by examining seventy-six Senate votes on amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.8 
Votes for amendments that shifted after-tax money toward families below the national 
median income level and amendments that shifted after-tax money away from families 
above the national median income level were classified as pro-egalitarian votes. Senators 
were rated on how many times they voted for pro-egalitarian policies.
Dennis used state median family income to determine the constituency opinion 
variable, assuming that states with median incomes lower than the national median would 
want their senators to be more pro-egalitarian and states with median incomes higher than 
the national median would want their senators to be less egalitarian. This is a slightly 
better but still questionable measure of constituency opinion. Ideology was determined by 
ACA scores and party was controlled. He measured the effects of the independent 
variables while controlling for the effects of others by generating partial r correlation 
coefficients.
8Chris Dennis, "The Revenue Side of Budgetary Politics: The Impact of Ideology on the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976," in Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation and Congressional Voting 
Behavior.(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 87-88.
16
TABLE 2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION 
MEASURED BY: GAS PRODUCTION, GAS CURTAILMENT, 
PERCENTAGE OF HOMES HEATING WITH GAS, AVERAGE 
RESIDENTIAL GAS CONSUMPTION; IDEOLOGY; PARTY; 
URBANIZATION; PERCENTAGE WHITE COLLAR; AND 
MEMBER’S PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN 1974; ON VOTING 




Measured by Gas Production
2.2*
Constituency Opinion 
Measured by Gas Curtailment
1.1
Constituency Opinion
Measured by Percentage o f Homes Heating With Gas
0.8
Constituency Opinion







Percentage White Collar -0.8
Members’ Percentage of Vote During 1974 Election 0.6
VALUES OVER 1.64 WERE SIGNIFICANT 
* SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL 
SOURCE: Mitchell (1979), 612.
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Table 3 illustrates that there was no statistically significant association between 
state median income and how high the senators rated on the pro-egalitarian scale. There 
was, however, strong association identified between both party and ideology and how the 
senator rated on the pro-egalitarian scale.
TABLE 3 PARTIAL r CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SENATOR’S TAX 
EGALITARIANISM RATING AND CONSTITUENCY OPINION 




Constituency Opinion Measured by -0.07
State Median Family Income
Ideology -0.59*
Measured By AC A Rating
Party 0.33*
♦SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL 
SOURCE: Bernstein (1989), 88.
Robert Bernstein and Stephen Horn’s 1981 evaluation of voting on energy issues 
in the House focused on five bills before the ninety-fourth Congress that would benefit 
major oil companies.9 They developed partial r correlation coefficients to test the effect 
of each independent variable while holding constant the effects of the other variables. 
Table 4 illustrates the results of this research. The independent variables included the 
ideology of the member based on ADA scores, party, and constituency opinion.
9Robert Bernstein and Stephen Horn, "Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology 
and Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Benefits," Western Political Quarterly 
34 (1981): 240.
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Constituency opinion was estimated by the amount of oil produced in the district, 
assuming the constituencies with large oil production would support the bills. The larger 
the oil production in the state, the larger the support would be. Again, this is slightly 
better than previous studies’ measurements of constituency opinion but disregards 
constituents who have nothing to do with the oil production business in the state and may 
even be environmentalists and be opposed to oil production. The index of the dependent 
variable was the representatives’ opposition to the bills. Consequently, a negative r 
indicates support of the legislation benefiting oil companies.
All of the coefficients are significant at the .01 level. With ideology and party 
controlled, a partial r correlation coefficient of -.18 demonstrates that knowing 
constituency opinion measured by the amount of oil produced in the district would help 
you predict how the representative from that district would vote on the identified five bills 
benefiting major oil companies. However, constituency opinion has a smaller r than 
ideology or party. Consequently, knowing ideology or party would increase your ability 
to predict a representative’s placement on the opposition to legislation benefiting oil 
companies index.
Gillian Dean, John Siegfried, and Leslie Ward’s 1981 study of Senate voting on 
the 1972 Family Assistance Program (FAP) considered constituency opinion and 
constituency economic benefit as separate variables.10 Many studies are based on the 
assumption that these two ideas naturally follow each other. The belief is that if there is
10Gillian Dean, John Siegfried, and Leslie Ward, "Constituency Preference and Potential 
Economic Gain: Cues for Senate Voting on the Family Assistance Plan," American Politics 
Quarterly 9 (1981): 344.
19
a large amount of money to be gained by the state by passing a particular program, then
it is assumed the people of that state will support it. It is believed that they are positively
associated: the larger the amount of money, the larger the support.
TABLE 4 PARTIAL r CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 
CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO LEGISLATION BENEFITING 
OIL COMPANIES AND CONSTITUENCY OPINION MEASURED 





Constituency Opinion Measured By -0.18
Amount o f Oil Produced In The State
Ideology 0.77
Party -0.39
ALL COEFFICIENTS SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL 
SOURCE: Bernstein and Horn (1981), 240.
However, Dean, et al., argued that regarding FAP there was a negative rather than 
a positive association between these two concepts. Constituency opinion polls showed 
that the greatest support for this program came from areas of the country that would not
gain much money overall from this program, the wealthy northeastern states. In sections 
of the country that would gain the most money as a result of FAP, the poorer southern 
states, there was the most opposition.
The authors used ADA ratings to measure ideology, net aggregate economic 
benefits for the states based on economic simulation of direct and induced economic 
impacts, constituency opinion based on public opinion polls about similar programs, and
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a scale of support for FAP for each senator based on three prior votes concerning the
issue.
Using maximum-likelihood estimates from probit analysis to measure the impact 
of each independent variable while controlling for the effects of the other variables, they 
measured the degree to which an increase in an independent variable would increase 
support for FAP. Negative estimates indicated that an increase in the independent variable 
would increase opposition to FAP. Their results are listed in Table 5. Both constituency 
opinion and state economic benefit failed to show a statistically significant role in the vote
on FAP while party and ideology did.
TABLE 5 RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION 
MEASURED BY PUBLIC OPINION POLLS, STATE ECONOMIC 





Measured By Public Opinion Polls
State Net Aggregate Economic Benefit -0.859
Ideology 1.179*
Measured by ADA Rating
Party 0.530*
♦STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THEOjB LEVEL 
SOURCE: Dean, Siegfreid, and Ward (1981), 349.
The use of public opinion poll results as a measure of constituency opinion is a 
more accurate reading of how all the people feel about an issue. However, it does not 
necessarily reflect how some of the people are "pressuring" their representatives.
2 1
For example, as described below, McCormick and Black found that during the six 
months prior to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977, a steady sixty percent 
of the public—when asked—were opposed to passage of the treaty. However, it still passed 
in the Senate by a sixty-eight to thirty-two margin."
The pivotal phrase is, "when asked." People may have opposed the treaty if they 
thought about it but it is plausible that most people are too busy attending to the duties 
of their day-to-day life to pay enough attention to foreign policy to "pressure" their 
senator to vote against a treaty. Nevertheless, the results of a well-done, articulate public 
opinion poll is an excellent reading of constituency opinion and a much better estimate 
of constituency pressure than the mere potential economic gain of a state. Clearly those 
people who live in the geographic constituency are the member's constituents but this 
study is attempting to glean information about the pressure put on members of Congress 
thorough the mail. The kind of people who write letters are not a representative sample 
of the whole constituency as the people who answer a public opinion poll (hopefully) 
would be.
James McCormick and Michael Black in their 1983 study of the effect of 
constituency opinion on the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty votes speculated that closeness to 
reelection, ideology measured by ADA-style ratings, party, region of the country, and past 
history of supporting President Carter’s programs would affect a senator’s tendency to
"James McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Voting on the Panama Canal 
Treaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (1983): 48.
22
vote for the treaty.12 * They also differentiated between early deciders and late deciders, 
speculating that some of the independent variables—such as public opinion-may play a 
larger role in the decision making process of late deciders. Table 6 illustrates their 
results using standardized logit coefficients to measure the relative influence of each 
independent variable.
TABLE 6 OPPOSITION TO THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND
REELECTION PROXIMITY, IDEOLOGY, REGION OF THE 
COUNTRY, PARTY AND DEGREE OF CARTER PROGRAMS 
SUPPORT STANDARDIZED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS
INDEPENDENT WHOLE EARLY LATE
VARIABLES SENATE DECIDERS DECIDERS
Close Reelection Proximity 1.21 1.12 -0.46
Ideology -3.76* -2.34* -2.04*
Northeast Region 0.99 -0.15 1.71
Midwest Region 1.54 1.72 1.86
West Region 0.01 0.14 -1.19
Border Region -0.76 0.16 -0.16
South Region -1.80 0.08 -1.88
Party -1.09 -0.39 -1.49
Previous Carter Support -0.55 -0.21 -0.34
* SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL 
SOURCE: McCormick and Black (1983), 54.
Senators, in both the early and late decider categories, who were up for re-election 
in 1978, who arguably should have been the most in tune to their constituencies’ 
opposition to the treaty, were not shown to be more likely to oppose the treaty. Ideology
12James McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Voting on the Panama Canal
Treaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (1983): 48.
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was the only variable to be shown to be statistically significant.
One of the earliest attempts to ascertain the role of the constituencies in 
Congressional decision making is described in a 1963 article by Warren Miller and 
Donald Stokes. In order to explore this role they developed correlations between 
constituency opinion and Congressional roll call voting behavior in three issue areas much 
like the previously reviewed studies.14 Their research found varying levels—depending 
on the issue area—of evidence of constituency opinion affecting roll call voting. The 
constituency opinion on social welfare and roll call vote correlation was 0.3. The civil 
rights correlation was better at 0.6 but with Southern districts excluded, this correlation 
dropped to 0.2. The correlation on foreign policy was slightly negative at -0.09.15 
While this is a classic study and served as the basis for subsequent analysis, it was riddled 
with sampling error.
Miller and Stokes’ measurement of constituency opinion was estimated by 
characteristics identified in the Survey Research Center’s (SRC) 1958 Election Study. 
The multi-stage random sampling procedure utilized by the SRC was designed for national 
studies, not studies requiring district-specific information. Respondents were interviewed 
from only 116 congressional districts. The average N per district was only thirteen. 
Furthermore, there was great size disparity in the N per district, ranging from one to 
thirty-one.
14Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress", American
Political Science Review 57 (March 1963):49.
15Ibid.
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- Robert Erikson recognized the sampling problems with the Miller and Stokes’ data 
and, in an effort to overcome these obstacles, developed a new measure of constituency 
opinion in a 1978 article reexamining Miller and Stokes’ study.16 He used simulation 
to combine district characteristics into an index of constituency opinion.
First he generated a regression equation to predict individuals’ opinions from 
background characteristic components such as blue collar/white collar, foreign stock/ U.S. 
bom, nonwhite/ white, and urban/rural. Then he estimated aggregated mean attitudes for 
each constituency as the weighted sum of the aggregated known population characteristics 
of that constituency, with the weights provided by the unstandardized regression 
coefficients of the initial equation.
By replacing Miller and Stokes’ sample-based estimate of constituency opinion 
with simulation data, he found an increase in correlations between constituency opinion 
and roll call voting behavior. The correlation for social welfare was 0.5, civil rights—with 
Southern districts excluded—0.3, and foreign policy 0.3.17 He acknowledges simulation 
is not—because of overlooked variables and lack of consideration for the local political 
culture—a perfect measure either but makes a persuasive argument that it is a more 
accurate reflection of the extent of the role played by constituencies in decision making 
than the procedure used by the Miller and Stokes. Erikson’s method of measuring 
constituency opinion assumes that aggregate demographics will predict whether a
16Robert Erikson, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of
the Miller-Stokes’ Data." American Journal o f Political Science 22 (August 1978), 511.
17Ibid.
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constituency will support or oppose specific policies.
Christopher Achen was concerned that empirical studies in the area of 
representation, such as the first eight reviewed in this paper, accept excessive 
simplification. He points out that constituent input is not fixed and single legislative 
districts do not act as a whole when putting pressure on representatives.18 He states 
there is no normative framework to structure empirical research in this area. Achen goes 
on to say,
In some instances, the expansiveness and delicate nuances of public opinion and 
representativeness are relinquished for empirical precision. Other times, while 
analytical theory supplies exactness, it is at the cost of sophistication and 
universality.19
He makes persuasive arguments against using correlations and path coefficients to study 
representation. In response to this research dilemma, he develops three new measures of 
constituency representation, reflecting the liberal democratic concepts of equality and 
popular sovereignty.
Proximity is one measure. It is based on the idea that all opinions in a district are 
held in equal importance and fall on a horizontal axis. The center would be the place that 
most of the views fall and—in order to be the most representative of his/her district—is 
where the views of the elected official should be. They would be closest in proximity to 
the majority of opinions held in their district.
However, Achen points out there is little the representative can do if this
18Christopher Achen, American Journal o f Political Science 22 August 1978, 476.
19Ibid.
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horizontal opinion axis is very long because of a wide variety of opinions in the district.
Even if the representative is in the middle, he/she may be far from some citizens on either 
end. The poor proximity score may not necessarily be the fault of the representative if 
they represent a diverse heterogenous constituency.
Centralism is, however, controlled by the representative. It is the unbiased estimate 
of the squared difference between the representative’s opinion and the true constituency 
mean opinion. It is a measure of the representative’s skill at minimizing his/her distance 
from the mean constituent opinion.
Achen’s third and final measure is representativeness. It is based on a regression 
equation: y = x +£ u ^  where y= the representatives opinion, u= the true constituent 
opinion mean, £"= the disturbance term, ^(intercept)= expected position of the 
representative’s opinion when the constituent opinion is ze-" (slope)=the expected
change in the representatives opinion when constituent opinion changes by one.
The ideal unbiased system that all systems are compared to is an interception of 
zero, =0 and a slope of one, =1. This illustrates that on average the representative has 
the same opinion as the constituent mean; as the constituent mean changes so does the 
representative’s opinion.
Herbert Weisberg examined and evaluated various theories of congressional roll 
call voting.20 He explained that most legislative votes are easy to predict but no single 
theory has been authenticated as the explanation for every prediction. There are still
20Herbert Weisberg "Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll Call Voting", American 
Journal o f Political Science 22 (August 1978), 554.
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fifteen percent of the votes that cannot be predicted be a single model. He suggested the 
nature of an organizing theory by developing an outline incorporating all the necessary 
separate elements discovered in the theories he reviewed. 7
He states that time must be intrinsic to the framework. Individual votes are not 
independent events and voting history must be considered. He went on to say that long 
term policy dimensions, ideology, party, and constituency pressures can not be excluded; 
nor can the short term influences of other representatives.
One of the most cited works on legislative decision making is John Kingdon’s 
study of congressional voting. The original research for his book, Congressmen ’s Voting 
Decisions, was conducted in 1969. The second and third editions, based on this original 
research, have been adapted to encompass the current political landscape including the 
ramifications of the variety of changes that have taken place during the last two decades. 
Many feel this is a landmark study.
Decisions are Kingdon’s unit of analysis. He interviewed members of Congress 
about recently taken roll call votes and asked them what influenced them to vote a certain 
way on each vote, thus developing an opportunity to determine if different actors 
influence congressmen at different times, and on different issues. He found seven actors 
which affect congressmen’s voting decisions. These seven actors are: fellow congressmen, 
constituency, party leadership, interest groups, the administration, staff, and reading.
Assuming spontaneous mentions of actors during the interview as the most 
important indicator of influence, he identifies the congressmen’s constituency as the 
second most important factor, exceeded only by the views of other Congressmen.
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Table 7 lists the percentage of the time each actor was mentioned by the
congressmen in the interviews following the votes.
TABLE 7 PERCENTAGE OF SPONTANEOUS MENTIONS AND MENTIONS 
IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUESTION OF THE 
FOLLOWING ACTORS: CONSTITUENCY (C.), FELLOW 
CONGRESSMEN (F.C.), PARTY LEADERSHIP (P.L.), INTEREST 
GROUPS (I.G.), THE ADMINISTRATION (A.), STAFF (S.), AND 
READING (R.) BY 1969 CONGRESSMEN WHEN ASKED, "HOW 




C. F.C. P.L. I.G A. S. R.
Spontaneous 37% 40% 10% 31% 25% 5% 9%
In Response to 
Question
50% 35% 28% 35% 14% 29% 40%
Not
Involved
13% 25% 62% 35% 60% 66% 52%
Total N 222 221 222 222 222 221 221
Constituency was spontaneously mentioned thirty-seven percent of the time; fellow
congressmen, forty percent. In response to a further questions, constituency was
mentioned most often, fifty percent of the time, leaving only thirteen percent of the time
that constituents were not mentioned as a factor in determining voting decisions. These
findings are bolstered by a number of observations. Kingdon (1989) states,
In a Congressman’s calculus, the probability of losing an election 
may be quite low, but the cost (the end of his/her career) is 
extremely high.21
21 John Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1989), 62.
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He goes on to say, "You rarely find instances in which Congressman vote against the 
intense feelings of any single group of constituents." 22 Kingdon’s study is based on a 
Congressman’s perception of their own decision making process.
There is consistent evidence that members of Congress feel they are being watched 
closely. However, there is equally consistent evidence that indicates they are not being 
watched by the average constituent much at all. Parker (1989), in explanation of this 
contradiction, says that the kind of constituents with whom members come in contact, 
either through the mail or trips back home, are issue-oriented and politically active. In 
addition, Kingdon identifies, "a tendency for successful candidates to have a rather high 
opinion of the intellect of the average voter."23 Kingdon goes on to say that winners of 
elections generally feel they won the election because the voters are ingenious while losers 
feel the voters were duped by party labels and single-issue special interests voters.24
While Kingdon based his results on the member’s perceptions, Robert Bernstein 
based his on the constituent’s perception of the congressional decision making process. 
In Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior: The Myth of 
Constituency Control, Bernstein argues—as the title suggests—that, "...nearly all members 
of Congress can behave as free agents on virtually all issues with little fear of voter
22Ibid, 41.
23Glenn Parker, Characteristics o f Congress (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 177.
24John Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1989), 31.
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retaliation or promise of voter reward.."25 He makes a persuasive argument that there is 
a lack of constituent knowledge of politics. He goes on to say this lack of awareness 
makes it impossible for constituents to have any real influence on, or control of, their 
representatives. He continues by indicating that the most important factor demonstrating 
this phenomenon is that members will be more likely to go with what they personally feel 
is best when faced with a decision where their personal preferences and those of their 
constituency are different.
He acknowledges there are many times when a member and his constituency feel 
the same way about an issue. He states this is merely a coincidence because members are 
long-term residents of their districts and consequently have similar views. However, he 
excludes these situations from the "constituency control" category. He argues that only 
when the member is cross-pressured between their beliefs and their constituent’s beliefs 
and they vote with the constituency there is "control." Given this research design, it is 
understandable that Bernstein found almost no evidence of constituency control.
Donald McCrone and James Kuklinski explored the delegate theory of 
representation.26 They argue that this theory dictates bilateral obligations on the 
representative and the represented. For this theory to work, the representative must feel 
compelled to react to what their constituencies say and the constituencies must send 
signals identifying their preferences to their representatives. The authors reason that if
25Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior: The Myth 
o f Constituency Control (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 56.
26Donald McCrone and James Kuklinski, American Journal o f Political Science 23 (May 
1979), 278.
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these two criteria are met, delegate representation takes place. They conclude that 
legislators and constituencies rarely express their opinions on the same matters. They 
argue a more realistic design is that representatives and constituents share a pattern of 
comprehension and consensus over a extensive realm of loosely-connected concerns. The 
next chapter sets out to determine if this is the case.
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH
Implicit in the fact that the franking privilege began as a service for mail both 
coming to and leaving from Capitol Hill is the notion that members of Congress expect 
to hear from their constituents. They do. In 1993, the House of Representatives Post 
Office received 30,612,000 pieces of incoming mail.1 2 That is an increase from the 
21,000,000 pieces received in 1992.3 Congressional incoming mail has increased 2000 
percent in the past two decades.3 As expected, members of Congress have responded to 
this constituent mail inflation with equal vigor. Studies show that the members' personal 
staffs currently devote over fifty-five percent of their time answering the mail4 In 1988 
the House out-going mail budget was $113 million.5
By all measures there has been an explosion of communication between 
constituents and their representatives in Congress in the past twenty years. This study 
analyzes one specific component of constituent/representative communications—the mail.
‘David Dunn, Assistant Director U.S. House of Representatives Post Office, interview, 
February 25, 1994, Washington DC.
2C.Q.’s Daily Congressional Monitor, December 6, 1993, (Washington DC: C.Q. Inc., 1993), 
4.
3David Twenhafel Setting Course: A Congressional Management Guide (Washington DC: The 
Congressional Management Foundation, 1992), 226.
4Ibid.
5CQ’s 1990 Almanac (Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1990), 75.
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The content of the mail received in one member’s office was compared to the recorded 
vote decisions made by that same member during a one month time period.
While some of the similar research reviewed indicates that there will likely be no 
causal relationship between these two components, the concepts of representative 
democracy and reelection realities indicate that the mail coming to the member would 
affect her/his legislative activity.
Former Congressman Morris Udall viewed keeping in touch with constituency 
opinion as an. "amalgam of civic virtue and political necessity."6 It is logical to expect 
that issues— identified by letters—are important to the member’s constituents and will 
therefore be important to the representative as well. As Congressman Udall’s comment 
points out, even if the member perceived her/himself as predominantly a Burkean trustee, 
she/he would have to be a delegate when politically necessary. In addition, it is important 
to note that the literature reviewed in the previous chapter was based on similar but not 
exactly the same research. Unlike other measures of constituency opinion, the mail in a 
Congressional office comes from people who are more politically active than other 
constituents. Therefore, it is logical that representatives would listen more closely to their 
concerns because they are more likely to vote in the next election.
If a member receives a great deal of mail about an issue, it is plausible she/he will 
assume this issue is of great importance to a vocal and active section of her/his 
constituency and vote and act accordingly. An argument can be made—regarding some
6Donald Tacheron and Morris Udall, The Job o f the Congressman (Indianapolis:Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1970), 6.
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issues—if she/he receives a great deal of mail indicating opposition to a bill, and not much 
mail in support of the bill, she/he will vote against it. It is unclear to what degree this 
mail/voting relationship exists but it is logical to expect some relationship is there. This 
study tests this hypothesis.
The issue categories generated by content analysis of the mail or "mail issues" are 
the independent variables. They are expected to have some effect on the "vote issues" or 
issues generated by the content analysis of the roll call votes, the dependent variables.
An indepth description of the member’s mail answering procedure is outlined 
below. However, a description of the kind of mail analyzed must be presented first. 
Fenno divides a member’s constituency into four categories displayed as concentric 
circles, each smaller than the other. The largest, the geographic constituency, is made up 
of all people in the geographic area which the member represents. This includes people 
who voted against her/him, and people who don’t vote at all. Within the geographic 
constituency is the reelection constituency, made up of the people who supported the 
member during the last general election. The primary constituency, the next smaller 
group, includes her/his most dependable supporters. They give the member money and 
would guard against her/his electoral defeat especially in contested primaries. Finally, the 
smallest group is the member’s "personal constituency" including close friends and 
advisors.7
7Richard Fenno, Homestyle: Members in their Districts (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 
1978), 1-26.
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Most mail answered personally by the member in this study was from her/his 
personal and primary constituencies. Undoubtedly this group of elite constituents play a 
large role in influencing the member’s voting decisions. However, the focus of this study 
is the "average" participant of the member’s geographic constituency who has no personal 
or political connection to the representative. Clearly it would have been interesting to 
examine this elite mail but this was not possible because of the politically delicate nature 
of this material. The openness and willingness of his office to assist in this research 
project did, understandably, not extend far enough to include the member's personal mail.
Therefore, the most accurate description of the first step of this research would 
be a content analysis of the "non-elite constituent legislative messages" the office received 
during the month. The "non-elite" distinction is necessary because personal mail from the 
member’s personal and primary constituencies answered directly by the member had to 
be omitted.
The "constituent" differentiation is required because mail received from outside the 
geographic district was omitted. The "legislative" term is required because any requests 
for casework—including grant and rule clarification work; requests for White House tour 
tickets, flags flown over the Capitol, or birthday greetings; and other non-legislative mail 
was omitted. The term "messages" is most accurate because while most of the 
communication into the office was in the form of letters, messages sent via fax and 
computer internet, as well as phone calls were analyzed. For the sake of brevity, unless 
otherwise noted, future references to constituent "mail", "letters", and "writing" refers to
all of these forms of communication.
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Another important research point is that each message was counted equally. A 
pre-printed postcard was given the same weight as a personal hand-written letter. While 
there was tremendous effort made to minimize research design flaws, it is not possible to 
eliminate them. This is most troublesome aspect of this study. It is not an accurate 
reflection of reality. Postcards and other "generated" mail was not held in the same 
regard by the staff and the member as other pieces. However, research limitations made 
this particular component unavoidable.
In addition, if one person wrote on two different occasions—even if it was on the 
same issue—during the month, each message was counted separately. While this could be 
a problem in a study covering an extended time period, one month is not an adequate 
amount of time for a constituent to write often enough to skew the results, particularly 
considering the large total N, 3,403 . Also, if one constituent wrote about more than one 
issue in a single letter, only the one dominant issue of the letter was counted.
The office had an extensive mail tracking system which was heavily utilized in 
analyzing the content of the letters coming into the office. In order to understand the mail 
issues content analysis procedure, the mail flow procedure in the office must be 
understood. After the mail was physically delivered to the member’s office in 
Washington by the House Post Office it was all opened, date-stamped, sorted and logged 
into the computer system. The "non-elite constituent legislative messages" were 
immediately assigned to a staff person to answer. The same person who was responsible 
for advising the member in a particular issue area—the legislative assistant or LA—also 
answered the mail in that issue area. This is one of any number of ways a member may
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choose to structure her/his office. Some offices have legislative correspondents or LCs 
who only answer the mail and do not advise the member on legislative items.
In this office, after the LAs received the mail, they determined if the issue in the 
letter had been previously addressed. They ascertained if they had written to someone 
else about it previously. If they had, they assigned a "text code" to it.
A text code is the name of a standard letter or a "robo" written in response to—or 
in anticipation of—a great deal of mail on a specific issue. Once approved, the LAs sent 
these standard responses to constituents without any input from other staff members in the 
office. Text letters were written by the LA and approved by the member. The member 
did actually see—and in some cases have a hand in re-writing—these standard responses.
While she/he approved the letters to go out, she,die did not see even a diminutive 
fraction—if any at all—of the mail that came in about issues answered by text letters. 
From the office’s perspective that is the entire purpose of text letters: to cut back on the 
number of people who need to see the response before it goes out to the constituent.
The first section of the research begins with this aspect of the tracking system. 
There were 3,403 non-elite constituent legislative messages received in the office during 
the month. Three thousand one hundred and seven or ninety-one percent were answered 
with text letters. Rather than beginning by analyzing the content of every letter coming 
into the office, the content of every letter going out of the office in response to the 
constituent mail was analyzed. On the surface it may seem to make more sense to 
analyze the actual incoming constituent letters and under perfect research conditions it 
would be. However, the office’s incomplete hard-copy constituent filing system and the
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hand-written and often legislatively vague style of most of the constituent letters, coupled 
with the large N (3,404) and the member’s hesitance to allow these letters to be physically 
taken out of the office prompted this different approach. It is safe to assume that the 
letter sent out by the member’s office covered the issues addressed in the incoming 
constituent’s letter.8
A list of all the text letters and the number of times each was used during the four 
weeks was generated. Mail issue categories were created by combining the number of 
text letters sent to constituents on the same topic. This initial content analysis of the mail 
consisted of an evaluation—via text letter responses—of ninety-one percent of the mail 
received. The remaining nine percent or 296 letters could not be analyzed using the same 
procedure. A different approach was utilized.
These individually answered letters out of necessity were treated differently in the 
office but the tracking system was equally extensive. When the LAs ascertained that a 
new individual letter had to be written in order to answer the issues brought up by the 
constituent, they wrote a response letter which was automatically assigned a "P" or 
personal number by the computer system. The LA then obtained approval from the 
Legislative Director (LD), or in some cases the Chief of Staff, had the letter proof-read 
by the Press Secretary, and sent a hard copy response out to the constituent. Unless it 
was a particularly difficult or entirely new topic, the member never saw the incoming 
constituent letter or his outgoing response to these individual letters. Electronic records
8Mail Manager for a member of Congress, interviewed August 14, 1993, Washington
DC.
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of these P letters were kept in WordPerfect; filed by the month the constituent’s letter was 
received in the office.
After the initial mail issue categories were established by the text code responses, 
a subsequent analysis of every letter sent out of the member’s office in response to the 
remaining nine percent or 296 letters was conducted. Appendix A lists the outcome of 
these procedures. It lists the number of messages received in each of the mail issue 
categories as identified by the letters sent out by the member’s office in response to 
constituent mail.
The two highest mail issue categories, Social Security and abortion made up over 
sixty percent of all the mail received. The remaining issues each make up less than nine 
percent of the total N, most making up less than three percent each. Over thirty percent 
of the mail she/he received was about preserving Social Security benefits. Visual analysis 
of the actual constituent letters indicate that the vast majority of this mail was in the form 
of pre-printed postcards. Appendix B contains samples of these Social Security postcards.
Abortion is the second highest category. The mail in this category includes both 
pro-life and pro-choice mail. There were few postcards in this category; it was largely 
individual letters.
As mentioned, the assumption in this research is that the mail was the independent 
variable. However, some letters in at least one issue category defy this assumption. 
Some of the mail came in as a result of previous votes rather than upcoming votes.
After the mail issue variables were determined the recorded roll call votes were 
analyzed. During the four weeks analyzed, there were one hundred-seventy-seven votes
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in the chamber. Sixty-nine were recorded. Some of these recorded votes were not issue 
related. It would not have been logical to assume constituents would have any input on 
these non-issue votes. Votes on pro forma issues, previous question motions, and repeated 
issues were omitted.
These omissions left forty-three of the sixty-nine recorded votes to analyze. The 
summary of this analysis is included in Appendix C.
The overwhelming observation is that there is diminutive over-lap between the 
vote issues listed in Appendix C and the mail issues listed in Appendix A. For the most 
part, the mail issues are different from the vote issues. There were no votes relating to 
65.37% or 2,225 pieces of the mail. In addition, 74.42% or thirty-two votes had no 
direction from the mail.
However, in the few cases where there were letters and votes about the same issues 
and it was possible to ascertain the constituents wishes by the outgoing letters, the 
member voted predominantly the same as the constituent’s wishes. However, considering 
the mail response structure of the office, it is not safe to assume that the member voted 
this way because of the mail. Nevertheless, these cases are summarized and listed in 
Appendix D.
With little seniority, the member could not play much of a role in Congressional 
agenda setting. The roll call votes she/he participated in were largely reactive responses. 
It is plausible that her/his proactive legislative activity in this time period could be more 
reflective of the mail she/he received. However, an analysis of this activity indicates this
is not the case.
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During the studied legislative days, she/he sponsored one bill and signed on as a 
co-sponsor to seven. Two were health care reform related and five were related to 
agriculture and one was a resolution recognizing the anniversary of a peace organization.
The issues in the forty-one agriculture letters were not at all related to the 
agriculture issues addressed in the legislation she/he sponsored and co-sponsored. In 
addition, the health care mail did not include any specific concerns addressed in the health 
care legislation the member so-sponsored. Finally, she/he received no mail about the 
anniversary of the peace organization.
Clearly, the genesis for the pieces of legislation she/he sponsored and co-sponsored 
was not the 3,403 non-elite constituent legislative messages this member received in 
her/his office during that month. There is little issue congruence in his proactive 
legislative issues and the mail issues.
The following chapter explores the explanations for, and ramifications of, this lack 
of issue congruence between both the reactive (roll call voting) and proactive 
(sponsorship) legislative activity of the member and the mail issues.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The decisive conclusion reached by comparing the content of the mail issues and 
the content of the vote issues is that there is little issue congruence. Even further analysis 
of the member’s pro-active legislative activity produced little overlap. The issues that 
cause people to write are quite different than those voted on by members of Congress. 
In this case, it was difficult for constituent mail to have much of an influence on 
Congressional decision making because the issues the constituents wrote about were not 
even on Congress’ agenda.
However, in cases where there was overlap, the member generally voted as her/his 
constituents who contacted her/him wanted. Again, particularly considering the mail 
answering scheme in the office, it is not safe to assume the mail was the only reason the 
member voted this way.
The evidence produced in this study of non-elite constituent legislative messages 
showed this kind of constituent input had only a small—if any—role to play in the decision 
process of this member in ther month studied. The exploration of both the product (roll 
call votes) and the process (mail answering procedure in the office) produces this 
conclusion. The further logical research steps of comparing the supporting and opposing 
mail was not possible because there were no direct votes about issues that received a great 
deal of conflicting mail.
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However, before a sweeping conclusion that constituencies have no role to play 
in Congressional decision making is reached, the research design must be reviewed. First, 
this is a case study and as such no sweeping conclusions about anything but this office 
during this particular time period can be reached as a result of this research. This study- 
out of necessity—omits key elements of potential constituent control. For example, elite 
mail that the member would manage her/himself was omitted. In addition, all mail was 
treated equally—including postcards. This diminished the role individual personalized 
letters may have. In addition, roll call votes and sponsorship of bills are not random 
samples of activity in Congress. There are various behind-the-scenes activities that can be 
beneficial to constituents and may have been done in response to some of the mail 
received. Finally, casework, which was omitted from analysis in this study, has great 
potential for legislative influence. In fact, the one piece of legislation sponsored during 
this time period by this member was the direct result of a casework situation.1
The overwhelming evidence against constituent input does, however, prompt a 
stream of logical questions. Is the tens of millions of dollars spent each year on 
congressional mailings a waste of taxpayer’s money?2 Is it simply a well-financed and 
well-run reelection scheme for incumbents? What, if anything, does this exchange of 
information produce that is helpful to constituents or the legislators? Revisiting the mail 
answering procedure in the office produces some useful answers.
'Mail Manger for Member of Congress, interviewed November 1, 1993, Washington 
DC.
2CQ’s 1992 Almanac, (Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1992), 48.
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While the member only saw a fraction of the mail answered in the office, the LAs 
who answered the mail also advised the member on the same issues. It is plausible that 
a personal letter about an issue that may come up in the future could serve as a red flag 
for the staff person who will eventually be writing a briefing memo for the member about 
that issue. In this instance, that constituent could have some influence. However, this 
effect may be diminished by the unadulterated volume of mail received in the office. 
Three thousand four hundred and four letters evenly distributed among eleven full-time 
staff members is fifteen letters each staff member must answer every work day. It is 
plausible that the staff member will not be able to remember very many issues brought 
up by constituents in the mail because they have must read and answer such a high 
number. Nevertheless, simply because the member did not personally see the letters is 
not a reason to automatically assume the mail has no influence on the member. There are 
many sources of information about legislation the representative may not see but the staff 
does. The LA’s responsibility is to "assist with legislation." They distill all of the 
pertinent available information about legislation into manageable amounts—usually a one 
or two page briefing memos—for the member. It is logical that the member and the LA 
deems input from constituents who are active enough to write—and consequently probably 
active enough to vote—as pertinent information.
The general attitude in congressional offices is that most mail is a finger on the 
pulse of the vocal (usually meaning politically active or single-issue) people’s concerns 
back in the district and it is important to pay attention to it. However, it is also regarded 
with some trepidation because the staffs perceive there is always too much of it and
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answering it is regarded as not as important as the other legislative duties in the 
Washington office. Also, many generated campaigns are based on misleading or 
sometimes simply untrue facts and the explanations of the complete situation is much 
more complicated than the constituents realized when they wrote or called.
Nevertheless, there are general cues that can be gleaned from the mail. In this 
study for example, the sheer volume of Social Security and abortion letters in the study 
reenforces to the staff—and therefore by extension the member—that these issues are 
volatile and decisions about them should be handled delicately.
As discussed in the literature review section, a member does not want to appear 
to be waffling. Any candidate would have had to have made a somewhat clear statement 
about abortion before she/he was ever elected. The member analyzed in this study was 
identified as a pro-choice candidate during the election. Therefore, it is plausible that 
mail about this kind of issue would have had little effect on the decision making process 
of this member even when this issue is on the House’s agenda. She/He had already 
publicly made up her/his mind and would most likely stick to that opinion.
Furthermore, the member received both pro-life and pro-choice mail on this issue. 
Visual inspection of the actual incoming letters indicated there was a greater quantity of 
pro-life letters but, as is often the case, there was no completely clear pressure to vote one 
way or the other. The constituency did not have an opinion but rather had many and 
sometimes conflicting opinions about this issue. Therefore, it would difficult to ascertain 
what role this conflicting mail could play. As discussed, some of the mail about the 
President’s economic plan came in as a result of the media coverage about it.
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People read about it in the paper, heard about on TV and this caused them to write to 
their Congressman about it. As one staffer put it,
People write in about whatever is on the front page on their local newspaper.
Many times that has nothing to do with what is going on on the floor.3
The media is one of a variety of cues which cause people to write their 
Congressman. The Catholic Church, for example, is very active in advancing their anti­
abortion agenda and consequently there was a steady stream of anti-abortion mail received 
in the office. The staff, however, knew this and treated this kind of "generated" mail 
differently.
The office did have an informal information filtering system. A tabulation was 
kept but a low priority was given to the pre-printed postcards requiring only an address, 
a stamp and a signature on behalf of the constituent as displayed in Appendix B. In 
contrast, some Congressional offices do not even answer postcards.
There is a great deal of information exchanged between constituents and 
representatives. However, this study found scant evidence that constituency mail plays 
much of any role in congressional decision making.
3Mail Manger for a Member of Congress, interviewed October 28, 1993, Washington,
DC.
APPENDICES
A P P E N D IX  A , G E N E R A T E D  P O S T C A R D  S A M P L E S
The following page contains a copy of two representative samples of the many 
postcards concerning the protection of Social Security benefits sent to the member.
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Dear Representative: •
I am a Senior Citizen, a member o f The 
Seniors Coalition and I live in your District. The 
President is trying to balance the budget on the 
backs o f Senior Citizens, and this is unfair! As.you  
know, Social Security is actually running a surplus, j
i
!
I want you to oppose taxing or cutting Social 
Security benefits. I’ve included my address. Please 
let me know if  I can count on you to protect my 
Social Security benefits. Sincerely,
Dear Representative:
As a Senior Citizen who lives in your district. I urge 
you to sign The Seniors Coalition CONGRESSIONAL PLEDGE 
which says:
“I Pledge to Oppose Any New Taxes 
or Cuts in Social Security."
Social Security is a contract between the government and 
its Senior Citizens. It's wrong for the government to 
break the contract now.
Remember, Social Security is not contributing to the 




A P P E N D IX  B, M A IL  IS SU E S  T A B L E
TABLE 8 NUMBER OF MESSAGES AND PERCENT OF TOTAL N IN EACH 
CONSTITUENT MAIL ISSUE CATEGORY IDENTIFIED BY 
LETTER RESPONSES GENERATED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL 
OFFICE
MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES 









Support for Protecting Social Security Benefits 1131 33.24
Support for and Opposition to Abortion 825 24.24
Comments on the Budget 292 8.55
Opposition to Wetlands Policies 201 5.91
Support for and Opposition to Gays in the Military 156 4.58
Variety of Health Care Reform Issues 85 2.50
Variety of Cost of Living 
Adjustments(COLA)/Retiree Issues
83 2.44
Support for and Opposition to a Variety of Tax 
Issues
80 2.35
Variety of Issues Identified in a Businessowners’ 
Group’s Poll of their Members.
62 1.82
Variety of Education Issues 55 1.62
Support for and Opposition to the Balanced Budget 
Amendment
47 1.38
Support for and Opposition to Proposed Additional 
Wilderness Areas
43 1.26
Support for Making English the Official Language 
of the United States
41 1.21
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MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES 









Support for Bread for the World’s "Many 
Neighbors, One Earth" legislative Campaign
37 1.09
Variety of Agriculture issues 41 1.21
Support for Campaign Finance Reform 27 0.79
Concern Illegal Aliens are Overloading the Social 
Service System
21 0.62
Support for and Opposition to Striker Replacement 
Legislation and Other Labor Issues
20 0.59
Opposition to Potential Vitamin Prescription 
Requirements
18 0.53
Concern about House Post Office Scandal 15 0.44
Support for and Opposition to Gun Control 15 0.44
Opposition to Safe Drinking Water Regulations 14 0.41
Support for and Opposition to Women in Combat 14 0.41
Opposition to Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Age 60 Rule
12 0.35
Support for the Federal Reserve System 
Accountability Act
10 0.29
Opposition to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)
5 0.15
Concern about Civil War in Bosnia 3 0.09
Support of Reductions in Banking Regulations 3 0.09
Opposition to Higher Appraisal Thresholds in Title 
XI of the Federal Institutions Reforms, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act
3 0.09
Concern about Tobacco Product Use 3 0.09
Concerns about Natural Disasters 3 0.09
Support of Boris Yeltsin 2 0.06
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MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES 









Opposition to Foreign Aid 2 0.06
Concern about Drug Enforcement Agency Raising 
Fees
2 0.06
Variety of Housing and Title XIII Issues 2 0.06
Support for Special Coin Minting 2 0.06
Support for National Endowment for the Arts 
(NEA) funding
2 0.06
Support for Better Intergovernmental Relations 2 0.06
Variety of Aviation Issues 2 0.06
Variety of Native American Issues 2 0.06
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MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES 









Other Including One Letter Each of:
* Support for Intelligence Agency Funding 
■"Opposition to Sanctions against Norway because of 
Whaling Efforts
■"Concern about Cutting Back the Post Cold War
Military Budget too Much
■"Concern about too Much TV Violence
“"Concern about Out-Of-State Waste
■"Opposition to Space Station
■"Support for Efforts to Solve MIA Questions in
Southeast Asia
■"Concern about Increased Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) Wind Resistance
Requirements
■"Support for Term Limits
"Support of Funding for the Small Business
Administration (SBA)
■"Support for International Trade Corridor
■"Concern about Availability of Welfare
■"Concern about Too Much Money Being Spent to
Rehabilitate Criminals
■"Concern about Child Abuse
■"Support for Ethanol in Gasoline
■"Support for Increasing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s Power
■"Support for the National Service Program
"Support for Decreasing the Government’s power in
Civic Asset Forfeiture Situations
"Support for Requiring More Uniform Product
Liability Laws
■"Opposition to additional Civil Rights Legislation
20 0.59
TOTAL
(rounding error creates total > 100%)
3,403 100.05
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A P P E N D IX  C , V O T E  ISSU E S
TABLE 9 SUMMARY OF SELECT RECORDED FLOOR VOTES





Sense of Congress that the Olympics in 
the year 2000 should not be held in 
China, passage.
NO PASS
Grants Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
trading status to China, passage.
NO FAIL
Prohibits full public disc) sure of House 
Post Office investigation reports, passage.
YES PASS
Information Super Highway Act, final 
passage.
YES PASS
Coast Guard authorization of 
appropriations for next fiscal year (FY)
final passage.
YES PASS
Supplemental appropriations for current
FY,agree to conference report and clear the 
way for Senate action.
YES PASS
Current FY Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, (OBRA), motion 
instructing House conferees to reject House 
increases and stay within Senate increases.
NO FAIL
OBRA
Motion instructing House conferees to 









Maritime Administration authorization 
of appropriations for next FY.en block 
amendment regarding a variety of issues.
YES PASS
Maritime Authorizations
Final passage of engrossed bill.
YES PASS
Emergency flood relief appropriations,
amendment to include non-germane Job 
Partnership Training Act language.
YES PASS
Flood Relief Appropriations
Final passage of engrossed bill.
YES PASS
NASA authorization of appropriations 
for next FY, amendment cutting $18 
million from the Consortium for 




Amendment cutting $8 million from the 




Amendment cutting $38 million from the 
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program.
NO PASS
NASA
Amendment allowing NASA to purchase 
helium from private sources.
YES PASS
NASA
Amendment limiting next FY authorizations 









Appropriations for the Departments of 
Commerce, Justice, State and related 
agencies for next FY, amendment adding 
$60 million for Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.
NO PASS
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State 
and related agencies appropriations
Motion to recommit bill to the 
Appropriations Committee with instructions 
to restore $81 million in three law 
enforcement areas.
NO FAIL
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State 
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment adding $22 million in funding 
for U.S.A. travel and tourism marketing 
abroad.
NO FAIL
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State 
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $22 million from the 
Small Business Administration.
NO FAIL
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State 
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $10 million from 
NASA’s facility construction budget.
NO FAIL
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State 
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $26 million in order to 









Appropriations for the Department of 
the Interior and related agencies,
amendment cutting $8.7 million (5%) from 
the National Endowment for the Arts 
(NEA).
NO PASS
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment eliminating $174 million 
(100%) NEA funding.
NO FAIL
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $5 million in oil shale 
research.
YES PASS
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting fossil energy research 
and development by $49.7 million.
NO PASS
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting national forest system 
appropriations by $11.8 million.
NO FAIL
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $1 million from Fish 
and Wildlife Service acquisition 









Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $14 million for 
developing Presido (CA) military base into 
a theme park.
NO FAIL
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $3.1 million for 
Steamtown.PA railroad museum.
YES FAIL
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $7 million from 
National Trust for Historic Preservation.
NO FAIL
Department of the Interior and related 
agencies appropriations
Final Passage of Engrossed Bill.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act, amendment 
insuring any appropriations for this 
program will not affect appropriations for 
Veteran’s programs.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act Amendment 
eliminating personal liability of volunteers.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act
Perfecting amendment, places limits on 
release of volunteer’s personal liability.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring a financial aid needs 
analysis for program participants.
NO FAIL
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National Service Trust Act
Amendment guaranteeing current workers 
will not be displaced by program 
participants.
NO FAIL
National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring a fiscal triggering 
device for the release of financial aid 
money.
NO FAIL
National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring written policies of 
institutional program participants stating 
they will not assist illegal aliens.
NO FAIL
National Service Trust Act
Perfecting amendment to allow religious 
institutions participating in the program to 
continue to provide spiritual guidance to 
illegal aliens.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act
Amendment guaranteeing educational 
benefits will not exceed 90% of GI Bill 
educational benefits.
YES PASS
National Service Trust Act
Final passage of engrossed bill.
YES PASS
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APPENDIX D, MAIL AND VOTE ISSUE CONGRUENCE TABLE
TABLE 10 MAIL ISSUE AND VOTE ISSUE CONGRUENCE  
SUMMARIZATION
MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Concern about 1131 OBRA. support support
Protecting 









MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Concern about 21 National support against*











will not assist 
illegal aliens.
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MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Concern about 21 Appropriations likely against*
Illegal Aliens for the support
Overloading the 0.62% Departments
Social Services of Commerce,










Concern about 15 Vote to likely support against
House Post Prohibit full
Office 0.44% public






MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Concern about 3 Emergency support support
Effects of the flood relief
Mississippi 0.09% appropriations,
River Flooding final passage.
Support of 2 Appropriations against against
National for the
Endowment for 0.06% Department of









MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Support of 2 Appropriat- against against
NEA Funding
0.06%



















MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Support of 1 Appropriations against against
Small Business for the
Administration 0.03% Departments












MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S






Concern about 1 Appropriations against against*
too much for the
money being 0.03% Departments
spent to of Commerce,
rehabilitate justice, State








ions to restore 





MAIL # VOTE CONSTIT- MEMBER’S

















*These votes, whi e not directly related to the specific concerns in the letters but
included because the general issues are the same.
In addition, the budget and some of the tax mail could have influenced the motion 
to instruct conferees on the OBRA bill and the supplemental appropriations conference 
report vote, but the specific issues mentioned in the mail where addressed in Committee 
not on the floor—if they were addressed at all. The roll call votes, which are the focus 
of this study, did not address the specific issues brought up in the mail. Instead, they 
were general approval or disapproval of the whole programs.
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